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In terms of compensation, the international oil pollution 
liability regime1 is very successful, but its success in deterring 
negligent navigation is not above question.  That said, the stated 
primary goal of the oil pollution liability regime is to provide 
adequate compensation against oil pollution damage.2  In 
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University, Oman,  LL.D (University of Ottawa), LL.M (University of Alberta), 
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 1. The international oil pollution compensation regime consists of two 
international conventions: (1) International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970); and (2) International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 16 I.L.M 621 (1972).  This article discusses 
the conventions as amended in 1992, see INT’L CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY 
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1992, reprinted in INT’L OIL COMPENSATION FUNDS, 
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 
CONVENTIONS AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 7-19 (2005), available at 
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English.pdf [hereinafter CLC]; see 
INT’L CONVENTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INT’L FUND FOR COMPENSATION 
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1992, reprinted in INT’L OIL COMPENSATION FUNDS, 
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 
CONVENTIONS AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 25-48 (2005), available 
at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/ Conventions%20English.pdf [hereinafter Fund 
Convention]. 
 2. This goal is explicitly stated in the preambles to both the CLC and the 
Fund Convention: “The State Parties to the present Convention . . . [are] 
CONVINCED of the need to ensure that adequate compensation is available . . .” 
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fulfilling this goal, the oil pollution liability regime has achieved 
great success.3  The success of the oil pollution liability regime in 
guaranteeing adequate compensation can be attributed to its 
various insurance provisions.  It not only imposes compulsory 
insurance on ship-owners but also requires them to carry a 
certificate of insurance as proof.  The regime then ensures oil 
pollution victims access to insurance proceeds by allowing them 
to bring direct action against the insurers. 
To further guarantee adequate compensation, it creates 
various compensation funds, contributed mainly by the oil 
industry.  Under the international liability regime, there are two 
such funds: the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 
(IOPC) and the Supplementary Fund.  Additional funds exist in 
North America: in Canada, the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund 
(SOPF)4 covers oil pollution damage not recoverable under the 
international regime; and in the United States, the Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF)5 provides compensation above and 
beyond ship-owners’ liability under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA).6  These funds function as an additional tier of insurance 
against oil pollution damage. 
 
 3. The problem with compensation as the primary goal is that it ignores the 
possible effect of law on the behavior of liable parties in reducing pollution 
incidents.  Consequently, the primary focus of the states’ representatives during 
the negotiation of the CLC and the Fund Convention was on who should pay for 
oil pollution damage instead of who could be induced through liability to reduce 
the damage. See R. MICHAEL M’GONIGLE & MARK W. ZACHER, POLLUTION, 
POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TANKERS AT SEA 183-90 (1981) (providing for 
an excellent account of the negotiation). 
 4. Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6, s. 91-93 (Can.).  Canada ratified the 
conventions on April 24, 1989.  See Suzanne Hawkes & R. Michael M’Gonigle, A 
Black (and Rising?) Tide: Controlling Maritime Oil Pollution in Canada, 30 
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 165, 226-27 (1992). Canada cast the sole negative vote 
against the adoption of the CLC in 1969, objecting to its limited liability and 
narrow geographical scope of application. Its application was limited at that 
time to territorial water, although the 1992 Protocol extended its application to 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). See M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 
176. 
 5. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006). The U.S. is not a party to the international oil 
pollution liability regime. It has its own oil pollution liability regime, contained 
in the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006) [hereinafter OPA]. 
Although the OPA is similar in structure to the international liability regime, 
the OPA’s scope is wider than that of the international regime. 
 6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761. 
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Though intended mainly to provide adequate compensation, 
these insurance provisions also incidentally lead to improved 
deterrence.  This is because insurance premiums needed for the 
above-mentioned insurance arrangements will roughly reflect the 
compensation paid to oil pollution victims; higher compensation 
will entail higher premiums.  Higher premiums will in turn 
induce insured ship-owners and the oil industry towards a 
heightened standard of care so that they pay less in premium.  
This incidental effect of insurance arrangements explains at least 
partly why incidents of oil pollution are on the decline.7 
The main focus of this article is to prove how the above 
insurance arrangements under the oil pollution liability regime 
have made it a very effective liability regime both in terms of 
compensation and deterrence (the effect of deterrence being the 
reduction of oil pollution incidents).  As these two concepts would 
be repeated throughout the article, brief discussion of their 
relative weight as goals of liability law may not be out of place 
here.  Although both compensation and deterrence are legitimate 
goals of liability law,8 the latter is the more important goal 
between the two. In fact, under economic analysis of liability law, 
which is used quite extensively in this article, deterrence is the 
primary goal of liability law due to its effect on the reduction of 
future incidents of liability.9  Fewer incidents will lower social 
loss and thus will improve total social welfare/utility.  On the 
other hand, compensation transfers money from one party to 
another without any change in the total social welfare. 
Of course, when compensation is paid by a party at fault, as 
is the case in most situations of liability, that party is also 
deterred from similar acts or omissions in the future.  However, 
the goal of adequate compensation can also be achieved without 
any improvement on deterrence.  This may happen when 
compensation comes from a source/party not liable for an incident 
 
 7. See Statistics, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N,  
http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 8. See Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U. 
W. ONT. L. REV. 111, 111 (1978-79). 
 9. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 230-32, 
267-69, 635-38 (2004). 
3
  
2011] THE ROLE OF INSURANCE 45 
 
(e.g., various funds under oil pollution liability regimes; they are 
funded by oil companies and not by liable ship-owners) or when 
insurance covers the loss suffered by the insured, though caused 
by a third party.10 
After a brief outline of the international oil pollution liability 
regime in Part I, Part II analyzes the success of the liability 
regime in providing adequate compensation through its various 
innovative insurance arrangements.  Where relevant, the article 
will also compare similar insurance arrangements in other 
maritime liability laws.   Part III briefly examines the connection 
between the above-mentioned insurance arrangements and the 
reduction of oil pollution incidents worldwide. 
I. OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY REGIME IN SHORT 
Prior to 1969, there was no special liability law for oil 
pollution damage.11  Historically, oil pollution liability was not a 
distinct heading of ship-owners’ liability.  Parties suffering 
damage due to oil spills could claim compensation under the 
common law principles of negligence, trespass, nuisance, and 
strict liability.12  Ship-owners could limit their liability under the 
general maritime liability law.13  In the aftermath of the Torrey 
 
 10. See Muhammad Masum Billah, Economic Analysis of Limitation of 
Shipowners’ Liability, 19 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 297, 300-301 (2007). 
 11. See ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE LAW 
AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 288 (2006). 
 12. See e.g., Southport Corp. v. Esso Petroleum Co., [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 414 
(Q.B.D.) (Eng.), appeal denied [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 446 (A.C.) (Eng.), rev’d 
[1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 655 (H.L.) (Eng.); The Wagon Mound, [1961] A.C. 388 
(P.C.) (appeal taken from New South Wales); Kirwin v. Mexican Petroleum Co., 
267 F. 460 (D.R.I. 1920); Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 
225 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), rev’d on other grounds sub. nom. Salaky v. Atlas Barge No. 
3, 208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953); In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973). The 
American cases are cited and discussed in Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, 
Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: 
A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L. J. 481, 490-502 (2000). 
 13. In international maritime settings, ship-owners’ general liability law was 
at that time contained in the International Convention Relating to the 
Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships, Oct. 10, 1957, 52 
U.K.T.S. (1958), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/treaties/ 
TS1/1968/52.  The liability was fault-based and the limit was calculated on the 
basis of 1,000 gold francs (US$67) per ton for property damage and 2,000 francs 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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Canyon incident in 1967, the international community realized 
the inadequacy of general maritime law in covering the expenses 
of devastating oil pollution damage.14  The international 
community adopted a specific liability regime to address the 
problem of inadequate compensation for oil pollution.  This 
regime now comprises the CLC and the Fund Convention.15  The 
CLC deals with ship-owners’ liability, which is strict but limited 
in amount, while the Fund Convention created the IOPC Fund to 
provide for oil pollution damage when compensation from ship-
owners is either inadequate or unavailable.  That said, the Fund’s 
compensation is limited as well, albeit at a higher ceiling. 
The combined maximum limit of compensation under the 
CLC and the Fund Convention is SDR16 203 million 
(approximately US$320 million).17  In 2003, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a new Protocol to the Fund 
Convention to create a Supplementary Fund, a third tier of 
compensation with a SDR750 million (approximately US$1.18 
billion) ceiling.  The ceiling applies to the total compensation 
available from the IOPC Fund and the Supplementary Fund 
combined per oil pollution incident.18  The Protocol came into 
 
per ton for personal injury and death claim. Unlike the CLC, the 1957 
Convention did not have any maximum ceiling for total liability. 
 14. Clean-up alone costs the British and French governments £7.70 million 
(US$18 million). Although it was impossible to estimate the damage to the 
environment, the total quantifiable cost was £14.24 million.  See Paul Burrows, 
Charles Rowley & David Owen, The Economics of Accidental Oil Pollution by 
Tankers in Coastal Waters, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 258 (1974).  Ultimately, the U.K. and 
France settled for slightly over US $7 million. M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 
3, at 153. 
 15. See M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 196. 
 16. Special Drawing Right (SDR) is the monetary unit of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  As of October 12, 2011, SDR 1 is the equivalent of US 
$1.57526. See SDR Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
 17. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 1; Fund Convention, supra note 1, 
at art. 4, para. 4. Under the CLC, the calculation is based on the tonnage of 
ships and ship-owners’ maximum liability is SDR89.77 million. However, for 
ships with 5,000 gross register tons (grt) or less, the limit is SDR4.51 million.  
Any ship above 5,000 grt may incur additional liability of SDR631 per ton, but 
the total cannot exceed SDR89.77 million.  It is noteworthy that one grt is 
equivalent to 100 cubic feet of enclosed space in a ship. 
 18. Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, art. 2, 
5
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force on March 3, 2005.19  It is now very unlikely that liability for 
oil pollution damage from any one incident will exceed the 
Supplementary Fund’s limit.  The U.S. is not a party to any of 
these international conventions.  Canada is party to both the CLC 
and the Fund Convention,20 including its 2003 Protocol,21 and 
implements the law through its Marine Liability Act.22 
The U.S. played a leading role during the negotiation of the 
CLC and the Fund Convention and the 1984 Protocols to these 
conventions23 but did not ratify them, objecting to their 
inadequate liability limit and preemption of U.S. state laws.24  
Until 1990, the U.S. enacted numerous federal acts to deal with 
both general and specific geographic oil pollution damage.25  The 
 
para. 4, May 16, 2003, Int’l Mar. Org., LEG/CONF.14/20, available at 
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/ 
Supp_Fund_e.pdf [hereinafter Supplementary Fund Protocol]. 
 19. See Status of Conventions, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/ 
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last updated Sep. 30, 
2011). 
 20. See About the IOPC Funds, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, http:// 
www.iopcfund.org/92members.htm (last updated Oct. 1, 2011).  As of October 1, 
2011, there were 105 contracting states to both the Fund Convention and the 
CLC, as amended by the 1992 Protocols. Id. Nineteen states are parties to the 
CLC but not to the Fund Convention. Id.  There are another 37 states, which are 
parties to the CLC in its original 1969 version.  About the IOPC Funds, INT’L OIL 
POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, http://www.iopcfund.org/69civilliability.htm (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2011). 
 21. As of October 6, 2011, there were twenty-seven state parties to the 
Supplementary Fund; most of the states are from the European Union. About 
the IOPC Funds, supra note 20. 
 22. Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6 (Can.). 
 23. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 613, 613-23 (1984); 
Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 15 J. MAR. L. 
& COM. 623, 623-33 (1984). These protocols never came into force due to the 
U.S.’s non-ratification and were reintroduced through the 1992 protocols with 
modification in the entry-into-force requirement. 
 24. Edgar Gold, Marine Pollution Liability After “Exxon Valdez”: The U.S. 
“All-Or-Nothing Lottery!”, 22 J. MAR. L. & COM. 423, 432-33 (1991). See also TAN, 
supra note 11, at 318-19. 
 25. Cf. Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act] § 311, 33 
U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (liability for discharge of oil or hazardous substance into 
any navigable waters); Deepwater Port Act of 1974 § 2, 33 U.S.C § 1501 (2006) 
(regulating oil pollution in deep-water ports); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
§ 2, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (controlling oil pollution in outer-continental shelf); 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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need for a comprehensive oil pollution liability regime had long 
been felt and Congress debated the issue for over fifteen years.  
The Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989, the largest oil pollution 
disaster in U.S. history26 up until the recent incident of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill,27 brought an abrupt end to the 
congressional debate, and Congress quickly enacted the Oil 
Pollution Act (OPA) in reaction to the incident.  Although more 
than 150 bills on various aspects of oil spill incidents were 
presented to Congress after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, none 
have yet become law.28 
 
43 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (regulating oil pollution from Trans-Alaska pipeline). 
See also Akintayo A. Ayorinde, Inconsistencies Between OPA ’90 and MARPOL 
73/78: What is the Effect on Legal Rights and Obligations of the United States 
and Other Parties to MARPOL 73/78?, 25 J. MAR. L. & COM. 55, 69-70 (1994); 
Kiern, supra note 12, at 505-07. 
 26. A total of 37,000 tons of crude oil spilled into the pristine water of Prince 
William Sound, Alaska.  Although it is the second largest oil spill in the United 
States, it ranks only thirty-fifth in major oil spills worldwide. See Statistics, 
INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N, http://www.itopf.com/information-
services/data-and-statistics/statistics/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  Its 
total economic cost was estimated to exceed $12 billion. See Kiern, supra note 
12, at 481-82. 
 27. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is the largest oil 
spill incident not only in the United States but also in the world.  An estimated 
4.9 million barrels (over 671,000 tons; 7.3 barrels = 1 ton) of crude oil escaped 
from the leaked well from April 20 to mid-July, 2010, when it was finally 
capped.  See Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of 
Civil Liability, 86 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011). Technically, it may not be vessel-
source oil pollution because almost all the oil spilled from the leaked well. 
However, some of the oil may have spilled from the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile 
offshore drilling unit (MODU).  The unit may be termed as a “vessel” under the 
OPA because the Act defines vessel very broadly to include any “watercraft or 
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation on water.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006) (emphasis added).  Although 
the structure was attached to the seabed at the time of explosion, it was capable 
of transporting the drilling equipment on navigable water.  In addition, the 
structure and the well together would be an “offshore facility” and such a facility 
is subject to the OPA.  The OPA defines an “offshore facility” as “any facility of 
any kind located in, on, or under any of the navigable waters of the United 
States, and any facility of any kind which is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters, other than a 
vessel or a public vessel.” Id.; see also Vincent J. Foley, Post-Deepwater Horizon: 
The Changing Landscape of Liability for Oil Pollution in the United States, 74 
ALB. L. REV. 515, 520-21 (2011). 
 28. See Marcus Baram, Nil, Baby, Nil: Congress Fails to Pass a Single Oil 
Spill Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2011, 7:19 PM), 
7
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The scope of the OPA is broader than the international 
regime in terms of vessel types29 and polluting oil.30  Ship-owners’ 
liability under the Act is also higher than their liability under the 
CLC, especially for larger ships.31  The right to limit liability can 
also be denied more easily under the OPA than under the CLC.  
Unlike the international regime, there is no maximum ceiling on 
ship-owners’ liability under the OPA other than the per ton 
limit;32 liability increases in proportion to the increased tonnage 
and can never be less than US$3,000 per ton for single-hull 




 29. “Vessel” is defined in the OPA to include “every description of watercraft 
or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation on water, other than a public vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37) 
(emphasis added).  On the other hand, in the CLC and the Fund Convention, 
vessel is defined to include only oil tankers and other ships which are adapted to 
carry oil and are actually carrying oil. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 1; 
Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, para. 2 (adopting the same definition 
by cross-reference to the CLC).  As discussed in the previous note, the Deepwater 
Horizon unit would be considered a vessel under the OPA but not under the 
international oil pollution regime because the mobile drilling unit was neither 
an oil tanker nor a ship “adapted to carry oil.” 
 30. While the international regime covers only pollution from “persistent oil” 
such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, and lubricating oil, CLC, supra note 
1, at art. I, para. 5, the OPA includes pollution damage occurring both from 
persistent and non-persistent oil. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23).  The OPA also includes 
non-petroleum oil such as vegetable oil and animal fat. See Kiern, supra note 12, 
at 509. 
 31. This is because per ton liability for oil pollution from a tanker cannot be 
less than US$3,000 for a single-hull tanker or US$1,900 for double-hull tankers.  
Under the original OPA, per ton liability could not be less than US$1,200 for 
any kind of tanker. See Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-241, 120 Stat. 516 (2006). The Act increased the liability limit 
provided in the OPA.  On the other hand, under the CLC, liability could be as 
low as SDR450 for a large tanker of 200,000 tons because the maximum liability 
for a tanker owner under the CLC cannot be more than SDR89,777,000. See 
CLC, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 1(b). 
 32. See WU CHAO, POLLUTION FROM THE CARRIAGE OF OIL BY SEA: LIABILITY 
AND COMPENSATION 241 (1996). 
 33. See supra text accompanying note 31.  The concept of a maximum ceiling 
on liability was something new for maritime liability law at that time.  Such a 
ceiling did not exist in the then-existing general liability law, the 1957 
Convention and its predecessor the 1924 Convention. See International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of 
Owners of Seagoing Vessels, Aug. 24, 1924, 2763 L.N.T.S. 123.  It even did not 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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addition to ship-owners’ liability, the federal government created 
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is authorized 
to spend up to US$1 billion for any single oil pollution incident.34 
II.  ADEQUATE COMPENSATION THROUGH 
VARIOUS INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
Oil pollution liability regimes under both the international 
system and the U.S. domestic laws have proven to provide 
adequate compensation in most of the actual oil pollution cases.  
Since the adoption of the OPA, no oil pollution incident in the 
U.S. has exceeded the combined limit of ship-owner’s liability and 
that of the OSLTF.35  Although oil pollution damage in some of 
the incidents falling under the CLC and Fund Convention did 
exceed their earlier combined limit,36 it is highly unlikely that 
damage from any future incident will do so especially in a country 
which is party to the Supplementary Fund Protocol. 
The success of oil pollution liability regimes in providing 
adequate compensation can be attributed to their various 
 
appear in the IMO’s Legal Committee’s draft. It was proposed in the 1969 IMO 
conference by the UK delegation and the proposal was probably inspired from a 
similar measure in the tanker-owners’ private agreement, TOVALOP, designed 
to provide for governments’ cleanup costs due to oil pollution. See Tanker 
Owners’ Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution [TOVALOP], 8 
I.L.M. 497 (1969).  See also M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 158-59, 173. 
 34. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006). 
 35. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-1163T, MARITIME 
TRANSPORTATION: MAJOR OIL SPILLS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY, BUT RISKS TO THE 
FEDERAL OIL SPILL FUND REMAIN 28 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1085.  However, GAO now fears that claims to the OSLTF 
fund following the incident of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill may well exceed 
the US$1 billion limit.  This limit applies to all the money paid from the OSLTF 
even though some of the payments are later reimbursed by the responsible 
parties under the OPA.  Therefore, GAO recommended that Congress amend the 
provisions of the OPA to calculate the limit of $1 billion based on net 
expenditures (i.e., expenditures after deducting the reimbursed amount from 
responsible parties). See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-397R, 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: UPDATE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISKS AND 
CLAIMS PROCESSING 14, 16-19, 30 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d11397r.pdf. 
 36. Among these incidents are the Amoco Cadiz in France (1978), the Erika 
again in France (1999), the Prestige in Spain (2002), and the Hebei Spirit in 
South Korea (2007).  For descriptions, see Incidents, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. 
FUNDS, http://www.iopcfund.org (last updated Jul. 11, 2011). 
9
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insurance arrangements as well as the higher limit on ship-
owners’ liability.  The word “insurance” is used in this article in 
its wider sense—that is, any guaranteed source of compensation 
for victims of oil pollution damage.  Thus, not only does ship-
owners’ actual insurance come within the term but the 
compensation from the IOPC Fund, the Supplementary Fund, the 
SOPF, and the OSLTF also fall under the term since the common 
goal of these funds is to provide for adequate compensation 
against oil pollution damage.  These funds collect contributions or 
premiums from the companies which receive oil transported by 
sea, while ship-owners pay the premium for their liability 
insurance against oil pollution liability.  The following is an 
analysis of how various insurance arrangements in the 
international oil pollution liability regime led to its success in 
providing adequate compensation for oil pollution damage. 
A. Compulsory Insurance 
The most important provision in the oil pollution liability 
regime in regard to adequate compensation is the provision of 
compulsory insurance up to the maximum liability limit of a ship-
owner under the CLC.37  The concept of compulsory insurance 
was quite revolutionary in maritime law at the time of the 
adoption of the CLC, although it was not without precedent.38  
 
 37. Under the CLC, owners of tankers over 2,000 grt are required to carry 
insurance. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 1. In comparison, under the 
OPA, insurance is compulsory on any ship over 300 grt. 26 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(2) 
(2006). Although the provisions give ship-owners the option to have other 
financial security or guarantees instead of insurance, they all function like 
insurance in terms of their effect—guaranteed compensation against oil 
pollution damage. Consequently, this article treats them all as insurance in 
their functional sense. Proceeds from these insurance mechanisms are 
exclusively available for oil pollution compensation. See CLC, supra note 1, at 
art. VII, para. 9. 
 38. The concept of compulsory insurance existed in the 1962 Convention on 
the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships.  See Convention on the Liability of 
Operators of Nuclear Ships, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 268-278 (1963) (text of 
convention). As can be seen from the name of the convention, the ships on which 
compulsory insurance was imposed were not ordinary merchant ships. See 
Alfred Popp, The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, in THE CIVIL 
LIABILITY AND FUND CONVENTIONS: MODEL COMPENSATION SCHEMES 81, 82 (2003); 
see also, Erik Røsæg, Compulsory Maritime Insurance, 2000 SCANDINAVIAN INST. 
OF MAR. & PETROLEUM L.Y.B. (2000). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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Before the oil pollution liability regime took effect, compulsory 
insurance had been in existence for quite some time in some non-
maritime liability laws such as laws on automobile accident and 
workmen compensation.  The usual explanation of compulsory 
insurance is that it secures the provision of adequate 
compensation against certain unforeseeable accidents.39 
The provision of compulsory insurance is the key element for 
the continuous success of oil pollution liability regimes.  Without 
compulsory insurance, the imposition of liability, no matter how 
high the liability limit, may prove useless due to the ability of a 
ship-owning company to hide behind its “corporate veil.”40  
Together with the provision of direct action against the insurer, 
compulsory insurance guarantees the availability of 
compensation up to the required insurance amount regardless of 
a corporation’s ability to shelter its assets. 
Compulsory insurance forces potentially liable parties to buy 
insurance up to the required limit.  These potentially liable 
parties may otherwise decide not to buy insurance because their 
total assets would be less than their maximum liability.41  
Empirical studies in automobile insurance have borne out this 
observation.  Those studies showed that the number of uninsured 
motorists can be as high as 20 percent in states with no 
 
 39. Although compulsory insurance is mainly thought of as providing 
protection for the victims of accidents, it also protects the injurer at the same 
time from the ruinous effect of high liability. See Richardson v. Pitt-Stanley, 
[1995] QB 123 (Eng.). In Richardson, Stuart-Smith L.J. rationalized the 
provision of compulsory workmen compensation insurance as a protection for 
employers by saying that “a small or even medium-sized employer may be faced 
with disastrous consequences for his business . . .  if he is faced with a large 
claim by an injured workman, which will make large inroads into his resources.” 
Id. at 131.  In the same case, the dissenting justice, Sir John Megaw, opined 
that the insurance was made compulsory for the “protection to a particular class 
of individuals, the employees.” Id. (Sir John Megaw, dissenting). See also Janet 
O’Sullivan, Industrial Injuries and Compulsory Insurance: Adding Insult to 
Injury, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 227, 242-43 (1995). 
 40. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006); see also infra text accompanying note 47. 
 41. Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability 
Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 166 (1990); see also GUIDO 
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compulsory insurance as compared to one percent in states with 
compulsory insurance.42 
Although it may be a rare incident when the liability of a 
shipping company would exceed its real assets, the company may 
artificially keep its assets low through forming corporate 
subsidiaries.  A ship-owning company can, and usually does, form 
a separate corporation for each ship in its fleet.  This has the 
practical effect of limiting liability to the value of the ship,43 
which may be zero in cases of accidents where the ship is a total 
loss.44  The practice of forming one-ship companies is widespread 
in the shipping industry,45 with the practical consequence of this 
being that the liability of the corporation may be limited to the 
“congeries of wooden planks or pieces of iron.”46  This is exactly 
what would have happened in the case of the Torrey Canyon 
incident had the liability not been ultimately settled.47 
 
 42. Gary T. Schwartz, A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured 
Motorist Plans, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 421-22 (1987); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects 
of Tort Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving, 
38 J. L. & ECON. 49, 54 (1995). 
 43. Even though a ship’s liability is calculated on the basis of its tonnage 
under general maritime law today, in the absence of compulsory insurance the 
only asset a plaintiff can get a hold on may be the damaged ship. 
 44. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of April 2010, the mobile 
offshore drilling unit completely sank after burning for three days.  Transocean 
Ltd., the company owning the unit, filed for limitation of liability petition. See 
46 U.S.C. § 30505.  The limit of a ship-owner’s liability is the value of the vessel 
after the incident and the pending freight.  The company sought to limit its 
liability to its pending freight (US$26.7 million) from the lessee of the unit, an 
affiliate of British Petroleum (BP).  Even if Transocean succeeds in its petition, 
the limit under the Limitation of Liability Act would not apply to the claims 
falling under the OPA.  Only the non-OPA claims such as personal injury would 
be limited. See Foley, supra note 27, at 528-29. 
 45. See TAN, supra note 11, at 34. 
 46. Lord Watson in Sailing Ship “Blairmore” Co. Ltd. v. Macredie [1898] A.C. 
593, 603 (H.L.). 
 47. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006) (liability is based on the value of the ship 
and pending freight after the incident).  The liability of the ship-owner was held 
by a U.S. district court to be US$50, the value of the single salvaged lifeboat. See 
also In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on 
other grounds, 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969); Kiern, supra note 12, at 503. The 
corporate structure of the Torrey Canyon also illustrates the concept of hiding 
behind the “corporate veil” in its extreme.  There, the ship was registered in 
Liberia and owned by a Bermudian company, the Barracuda Tanker 
Corporation, which was a corporate subsidiary of the Union Oil, an American 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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The goal of adequate compensation requires that all ships 
carry insurance regardless of whether the flag state of a ship is 
party to the international oil pollution liability regime. To achieve 
this goal, the CLC imposes an obligation on state parties to 
ensure that both local ships48 and foreign ships above 2,000 grt 
carry insurance before entering ports or off-shore terminals of a 
contracting state.49  This requirement neutralizes any 
competitive advantage that a ship from a non-contracting state 
may have over ships from contracting states.  The provision is 
quite innovative in the sense that it forces ships from non-
contracting states to purchase compulsory insurance if they wish 
to trade in a contracting state to the CLC. 
Traditionally, a ship is obliged to follow the law of its flag 
state; coastal and port states cannot usually impose their laws on 
a foreign vessel.50  The principle of flag state supremacy over port 
or coastal states gives ships of a state with less stringent 
maritime laws some competitive advantage over ships from states 
with stricter laws.51  For example, in the absence of the above 
provision, a state might decide not to become a party to the CLC 
so that the ships from that state do not incur the cost of 
compulsory insurance, thereby gaining a competitive advantage 
over ships from states that are party to the CLC.  The obligation 
to carry compulsory insurance under the CLC removes the 
incentive for ship-owners to register their ships in so-called “flags 
of convenience” in an attempt to avoid the cost of insurance.  In 
other words, when it comes to compulsory insurance for oil 
pollution liability, these ships cannot avoid purchasing such 
insurance by hiding behind a flag state not party to the CLC.52 
 
company.  The ship was then bareboat-chartered to the Union Oil, which in turn 
voyage-chartered it to the British Petroleum, a UK company. See M’GONIGLE & 
ZACHER, supra note 3, at 149-50; TAN, supra note 11, at 288-89. 
 48. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 10. 
 49. Id. at art. VII, para. 11. 
 50. See RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 76 (1994). 
 51. See TAN, supra note 11, at 23-25, 34-35, 47-67; see also William Tetley, 
The Law of the Flag, ‘Flag Shopping’ and the Choice of Law, 17 TUL. MAR. L.J. 
175 (1992); Richard Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to 
National Security, 3 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 67 (1980). 
 52. See Hawkes & M’Gonigle, supra note 4, at 224; M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, 
supra note 3, at 226, 67, 236; TAN, supra note 11, at 181-82. 
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The success of the international oil pollution liability regime 
in providing adequate and secured compensation inspired the 
international community and the IMO to adopt similar insurance 
arrangements in other maritime liability law conventions.  For 
example, the convention on compensation for passengers’ 
personal injury or death as well as for personal property damage 
and loss,53 the conventions on compensation for loss or damage 
from hazardous and noxious substance (HNS) and from bunker 
oil54 pollution (Bunker Convention), all now have provisions for 
compulsory insurance.55  In fact, there were attempts to include 
similar provisions covering all areas of maritime liability law via 
amendment of the 1976 Liability Convention during the 
negotiation of its 1996 Protocol.56 
Although the 1976 Liability Convention and its 
predecessors57 do not provide for compulsory insurance, a ship-
owner may still be required to carry insurance up to the liability 
limits of these conventions when the Bunker Convention applies 
to the ship.  This is because the Bunker Convention imposes 
compulsory insurance for oil pollution from bunkers of non-
 
 53. INT’L MAR. ORG, PROTOCOL OF 2002 TO THE ATHENS CONVENTION RELATING 
TO THE CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS AND THEIR LUGGAGE BY SEA, 1974, art. 3 (2002), 
available at http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/dipcon/20.pdf [hereinafter 
2002 Athens Convention]. 
 54. Bunker oil is fuel oil for a ship as opposed to the oil the ship is carrying.  
Pollution from such oil is not covered by CLC and Fund Conventions unless it is 
from an oil-carrying ship. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 5 (providing the 
definition of “oil”). 
 55. International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substance by Sea 
(HNS) art. 7, May 3, 1996, U.N.T.S. [hereinafter HNS Convention]; 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 
art. 7, Mar. 23, 2001, available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/ 
document/cm66/6693/6693.pdf [hereinafter Bunker Convention]. 
 56. See MAR. TRANSP. COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REPORT 
ON THE REMOVAL OF INSURANCE FROM SUBSTANDARD SHIPPING 1, 62 (2004), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/15/32144381.pdf. 
 57. The predecessors are the 1924 and 1957 Conventions.  These are still in 
force for some states.  A resolution by the 2001 IMO conference during the 
adoption of the Bunker Convention urged the states to adopt the 1976 
convention and its 1996 protocol so that a uniform liability for bunker oil 
pollution can be maintained in all contracting states to the Bunker Convention. 
See LING ZHU, COMPULSORY INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION FOR BUNKER OIL 
POLLUTION DAMAGE 33, 45 (2007). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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tankers,58 and the maximum amount of compulsory insurance for 
bunker oil pollution is set at the liability limit under the 1976 
Liability Convention or its 1996 Protocol.59  Consequently, when 
a country is a signatory to the Bunker Convention,60 ships 
registered in that country are automatically required to carry 
insurance up to the liability limit of the general maritime liability 
conventions.  Even when a ship is not registered in a contracting 
state to the Bunker Convention but wants to enter the ports of a 
contracting state, it has to carry such insurance.61 
Since the claimants for bunker oil pollution and for other 
maritime liabilities have to share the same liability fund,62 the 
existence of compulsory insurance for bunker oil pollution also 
ensures compensation for all other types of maritime liability.  
Such liabilities include, inter alia, liability for cargo loss or 
damage.63  As a result, compulsory insurance for bunker oil 
pollution also guarantees compensation for cargo liability 
claimants despite the fact that the conventions on cargo liability 
do not require compulsory insurance.64  In short, the provision of 
 
 58. Oil pollution from the bunkers of tankers is already covered by the CLC.  
The CLC defines “oil” as any “persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude 
oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil, whether carried on board a ship 
as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship.” CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 5 
(emphasis added). 
 59. Bunker Convention, supra note 55, at art. 7.1.  Insurance is required for 
any ship over 1,000 grt. 
 60. The Bunker Convention entered into force on November 21, 2008. See 
Bunker Convention, supra note 55. 
 61. See Bunker Converntion, supra note 55, at art. 7, para. 12; CLC, supra 
note 1, at art. VII, para. 11. Like in the CLC, this provision also checks the 
competitive advantage of a ship flying the flag of a non-contracting state over 
the ships from contracting states. See ZHU, supra note 57, at 34. 
 62. This is because unlike the liability for oil pollution under the CLC or for 
pollution under the HNS Convention, the Bunker Convention does not envisage 
an exclusive fund for bunker oil pollution.  Liability for bunker oil pollution is 
treated equally with other liabilities of a ship-owner under general liability 
conventions. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 9; HNS Convention, supra 
note 55, at art. 12, para. 9.  See also Chao Wu, Liability and Compensation for 
Bunker Pollution, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 553, 564 (2002). 
 63. See Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, art. II, 
Nov. 19, 1976, 1456 U.N.T.S. 221; see also PATRICK GRIGGS ET AL., LIMITATION OF 
LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIMS 134-36 (4th ed. 2005). 
 64. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, 120 L.N.T.S. 155; 
15
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compulsory insurance under the Bunker Convention indirectly 
ensures the availability of insurance against almost all types of 
maritime liabilities.  It can thus be said that compulsory 
insurance has become a feature common to almost all types of 
maritime liability.65  The HNS Convention, however, is not yet in 
force66 so there is no compulsory insurance for liability arising 
from an accident involving hazardous and noxious substances 
except when such claims fall under the general maritime liability 
law. 
B. Direct Action against Insurers 
The object of ensuring adequate compensation to oil pollution 
victims is further strengthened by the provision of direct action 
against the insurer of a liable ship-owner.67  This is a major 
departure from traditional insurance policy under which a third 
party may not bring an action against the insurer because 
insurance is a contract between the insurer and the insured ship-
owner.  Therefore, there is no privity of contract between the 
insurer and a third party victim.  This is especially the case in 
indemnity insurance as opposed to mere liability insurance.68 
 
Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 127; 
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 17 
I.L.M. 806.  The liability limit under the cargo conventions is further subject to 
the overall limit under the 1976 Liability Convention as cargo claim is only one 
of many possible property claims to be met from the general limitation fund set 
up according to the 1976 Liability Convention. 
 65. However, claimants for non-bunker oil pollution may encounter 
difficulties to obtain compensation despite compulsory insurance because they 
would not be able to bring direct action against the insurer. See infra, text 
accompanying discussion on direct action against insurers. 
 66. For the status of the HNS Convention, see Status of Conventions, INT’L 
MAR. ORG., supra note 19.  In order to expedite the ratification process by 
removing some obstacles that stand in the way of ratification, a protocol to the 
HNS Convention was adopted in April 2010.  For an overview and the texts of 
the HNS Convention and the 2010 Protocol, see The Convention, HNS 
CONVENTION, http://www.hnsconvention.org/en/theconvention.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2011). 
 67. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 8. 
 68. See STEVEN J. HAZELWOOD, P & I CLUBS LAW AND PRACTICE 141 (3d ed. 
2000).  See also West Wake Price & Co. v. Ching, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 45 at 49 
(Eng.); Ali Galeb Ahmed et al. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n et 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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Although the purpose of both liability and indemnity 
insurance is the same—i.e., protection against the financial 
burden of third party liability—indemnity insurance, particularly 
the type provided by the ship-owners’ liability insurers 
(Protection and Indemnity [P&I] clubs), is strictly based on a 
“pay-to-be-paid” policy.69  An insured ship-owner has to first pay 
out the victim in order to claim indemnification from the insurer.  
The oil pollution liability regime has changed this practice by 
affording the pollution victims the right to bring direct action 
against insurers.70 
Compulsory insurance would be of no use to a victim of oil 
pollution if insurers could deny compensation to victims of oil 
pollution by pleading policy defenses or exceptions against 
insured ship-owners.71  Commensurate with its primary goal of 
adequate compensation, the oil pollution liability regime prevents 
insurers from invoking an insured’s breach of contractual 
obligations, such as arguing failure to pay premium to deny 
insurance benefits to victims of oil pollution.  The CLC stipulates 
that insurers cannot avail themselves of any defense against a 
pollution victim which they could otherwise raise against the 
insured.72 
The only exception to the above rule is the defense of willful 
misconduct of the insured;73 however, an insurer never has to pay 
more than the liability limit under the CLC even when the 
insured ship-owner would be unable to use its right to limit 
liability due to certain conduct which may not necessarily amount 
to willful misconduct.74 
 
al., 640 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1981); Weeks v. Beryl Shipping Inc., 845 F.2d 
304, 306 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 69. See GOTTHARD GAUCI, OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: CIVIL LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE 221-24 (1997); see also TAN, supra note 11, at 42-43. 
 70. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 8 (“Any claim for compensation 
for pollution damage may be brought directly against the insurer or the person 
providing financial security for the owner’s liability for pollution damage.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 71. Røsæg, supra note 38, at 10. 
 72. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 8. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at art. V, para. 2. Willful misconduct appears to be different from 
conduct barring limitation of liability.  The latter conduct is ship-owner’s 
“personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause [pollution] 
17
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Again inspired by the success of the oil pollution liability 
regime in providing adequate compensation, the IMO 
incorporated the provision of direct action against the insurer 
into other maritime liability conventions such as the HNS 
Convention, the Athens Convention, and the Bunker 
Convention.75  As discussed earlier, compulsory insurance has 
incidentally become a feature of all maritime liability laws 
through the Bunker Convention.  This, however, cannot be said 
with regard to direct action against insurers.  When compulsory 
insurance in the amount of the general liability fund exists 
against combined liability for both bunker oil pollution and other 
liability claims, only claimants for bunker oil pollution liability 
can bring a direct action against the insurer.76  This is because 
the basis of non-bunker oil pollution claims are in the general 
liability conventions, which do not contain provisions allowing 
direct action.  The basis for bunker oil pollution liability is, of 
course, the Bunker Convention with its provision on direct 
insurance. 
Direct action against an insurer as well as compulsory 
insurance should be included in general liability conventions, if 
adequate compensation is thought to be a desirable goal of other 
maritime liability laws as well.  Although adequate compensation 
 
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably 
result.”  Ship-owners’ personal acts or omissions to cause pollution damage do 
not appear to be a defense for an insurer against a pollution victim’s claims.  In 
this respect, willful misconduct seems to be a more serious offense than a 
personal act or omission with the intent to cause damage.  Yet, for the purpose 
of denying the right to limited liability, willful misconduct appears to be a lesser 
fault than personal act or omission because the latter – and not the former – 
deprives the ship-owner the right to limit liability.  In practice and in their 
ordinary meaning, they may be one and the same thing.  In that case, there 
seems to be some contradiction or oversight in article VII, paragraph 8 of the 
CLC because one act is a defense and the other is not.  Similar comments can be 
made also with regard to “reckless conduct,” the other conduct barring the right 
of limitation.  However, if this conduct also amounts to willful misconduct, 
victims of pollution would lose the right of direct action against insurers more 
often than would be the case otherwise. 
 75. See HNS Convention, supra note 55, at art. 12, para. 8; 2002 Athens 
Convention, supra note 53, at art. 5, para. 10; Bunker Convention, supra note 
55, at art. 7, para. 10. 
 76. Bunker Convention, supra note 55, at art. 7, para. 10. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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per se should not be the goal of liability law,77 adequate 
compensation through compulsory insurance and direct action 
may enhance the deterrence purpose of liability law.78  Without 
compulsory insurance and direct action, there is the possibility 
that a ship-owner may escape its liability, which may in turn lead 
the ship-owner to reduce its level of care. 
Ship-owners and their liability insurers, the P&I clubs,79 are 
naturally opposed to the inclusion of compulsory insurance and 
direct action provisions in general maritime liability laws like the 
1976 Liability Convention.  They may argue that such provisions 
are not feasible in non-oil pollution liability regimes because of 
the diverse nature of cargo on non-tankers and the lack of 
insurability for such cargo.  These arguments are tenuous 
because ship-owners already have insurance against these types 
of liability through their P&I clubs.  There may not be any need 
to change the present insurance arrangements at all.  All that 
would be needed is to make compulsory what ship-owners always 
purchase voluntarily and then to secure the benefit of existing 
insurance for liability claimants through direct action against the 
insurer.  As mentioned earlier, compulsory insurance forces ship-
owners, who try to escape liability through the “corporate veil,” to 
buy insurance.  Direct action, on the other hand, ensures that the 
intended beneficiaries will in fact have access to the proceeds of 
the compulsory insurance. 
 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 8 and 9; see also SHAVELL, supra note 
9, at 267-69, 635-38. 
 78. It is noteworthy here that compensation does not affect the goal of 
deterrence if compensation is fully borne by the party who can cost-effectively 
prevent or reduce oil pollution.  On how to balance both deterrence and 
compensation goals through liability law, see Michael J. Trebilcock, Incentive 
Issues in the Design of ‘No-Fault’ Compensation System, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 19 
(1989). 
 79. Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs are the mutual insurance 
companies of ship-owners.  Ship-owners are both the owners and customers of 
the clubs.  The thirteen largest clubs, covering more than ninety percent of the 
world’s tonnage, formed the International Group of P&I Club. See INT’L GRP. OF 
P&I CLUBS, http://www.igpandi.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
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C. Certificate of Insurance 
Compulsory insurance and direct action against insurers may 
fail to guarantee adequate compensation if ship-owners can avoid 
verification by state authorities of insurance.  In order to 
facilitate such verification, ship-owners are required to carry on 
board proof of insurance in the form of an insurance certificate.80  
A state party to the CLC can deny entry to a port or terminal 
installation any ship without a certificate.81  Traditionally, a flag 
state issues the various certificates a ship is required to carry.82  
However, for insurance certification under the CLC, the flag state 
must be a party to the CLC for its certification to be acceptable to 
other CLC state parties.83 
A ship from a non-CLC state wishing to trade in a state party 
to the CLC has to obtain the certificate from a CLC state.  This 
provision has effectively checked the possibility of a certificate by 
a flag state without properly verifying the existence of insurance 
and the financial viability of the insurer.  The provision also 
indirectly induces states to become parties to the CLC so that 
they can issue the certificate to their own ships in order to enable 
them to trade with major oil-importing countries,84 most of whom 
are parties to the CLC/Fund Convention regime with the notable 
exception of the United States.85  In order to further ensure that 
 
 80. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 4. 
 81. Id. at art. VII, para. 10. 
 82. For example, under MARPOL 73, flag states are required to issue 
certificates of compliance with regard to the conformity of a ship to construction 
and design provisions.  Similarly, it is also the duty of a flag state to issue 
certificate confirming that the tank size of oil tankers conforms to the MARPOL 
provisions.  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 217(3), 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].  UNCLOS requires 
flag states to ensure the existence of necessary certificates on board their ships: 
“States shall ensure that vessels flying their flag or of their registry carry on 
board certificates required by and issued pursuant to international rules and 
standards. . . . ” Id. at art. 217(3). 
 83. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 2. 
 84. The major oil importers are now the United States, Japan, China, Italy, 
and South Korea.  With the exception of the United States, the rest of the 
countries are parties to the CLC.  See About the IOPC Funds, INT’L OIL 
POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, supra note 20 (under the heading “States Parties to 
both the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention”). 
 85. However, in the United States, a similar certificate is also required under 
the OPA. See 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
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insurance does not exist only on paper, a contracting state, when 
in doubt about the financial capability of an insurer, can consult 
with the certificate-issuing contracting state.86 
D. Insurance through the IOPC Fund 
The primacy of the goal of adequate compensation over that 
of deterrence under the international oil pollution liability regime 
is most obvious in its creation of the IOPC Fund.  As 
contributions to this fund come exclusively from cargo owners – 
i.e., the oil industry and not ship-owners – the question of 
deterrence seems to be irrelevant.  If oil pollution incidents arise 
as a result of negligence, whether human or mechanical, it will be 
almost without exception the negligence of ship-owners or their 
employees.87  Despite the absence of any direct deterrence effects 
from this provision, the creation of the IOPC Fund serves the oil 
pollution liability regime’s stated purpose of adequate 
compensation by providing for a second layer of insurance 
protection against pollution damage. 
As a second layer of insurance, the IOPC Fund provides 
compensation only if a victim of oil pollution damage is unable to 
obtain full compensation from ship-owners for one reason or 
another despite the above insurance arrangements.  The IOPC 
Fund provides compensation when compensation from the owner 
of the involved ship is either unavailable88 or inadequate.89  The 
first scenario may occur in the unlikely event that both a ship-
 
 86. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 7. 
 87. Although it is true that a shipping incident involving oil as cargo may 
cause more damage to third parties and the environment than shipping 
incidents involving non-oil cargo, there is no logic in putting the blame on 
owners of the cargo (i.e., oil companies) since damage such as this will not 
improve deterrence.  Despite this, during the negotiations of the CLC and the 
Fund Conventions, some delegates argued to impose liability on cargo owners. 
For example, according to the Danish delegate in the 1969 conference, 
“Maritime transport was not dangerous in itself: it was only dangerous if the 
goods carried were dangerous and it was therefore normal to impose liability on 
the cargo for any damage caused to a third party.  The industry which made a 
profit from that business should also accept the risks entailed.” INT’L MAR. ORG., 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONFERENCE ON MARINE POLLUTION 
DAMAGE 1969, 628 (1973). See also M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 172. 
 88. IOPC Funds, supra note 36, at art. 4(1)(b). 
 89. Id. at art. 4(1)(c). 
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owner and its liability insurer go bankrupt.90  The second and 
more likely scenario arises where the ship-owner has limited 
liability.  In fact, most cases involving compensation from the 
IOPC Fund in the past arose due to the inadequacy of ship-
owners’ liability limit.91 
The contributions to support the IOPC Fund come 
collectively from cargo interests, meaning the oil companies who 
receive oil via the sea from contracting states to the Fund 
Convention.92  The contribution mechanisms of the oil-receiving 
companies to the Fund are comparable to the premium paid by 
ship-owners to their mutual protection and indemnity insurance 
(P&I) clubs.  In both cases the total contribution is calculated on 
the basis of the Fund’s or the P&I club’s annual oil pollution 
liability payouts to pollution victims.  The only difference is that 
while the P&I clubs take into account the claim history and/or 
care level of each ship-owner for the calculation of that individual 
ship-owner’s contribution, the IOPC Fund does not and cannot 
consider these factors in determining the levies it imposes on 
each contributing oil company.93  The single factor for purposes of 
calculating the contributions of an individual oil company is the 
amount of its total oil-receipt via sea transport.94  Like the 
 
 90. This may also occur if a tanker does not have insurance at all because 
insurance is not compulsory for tankers of 2,000 grt or below. 
 91. See Thomas Mensah, The IOPC Funds: how it all started, in THE IOPC 
FUNDS’ 25 YEARS OF COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF OIL POLLUTION INCIDENTS 48 
(2003); see also TAN, supra note 11, at 305-06. 
 92. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10. 
 93. This is simply because there is hardly anything an oil company can do to 
reduce accidental oil spills from ships except that the company may take some 
care to choose seaworthy ships for the carriage of its cargo. 
 94. There were suggestions for imposing differentiated levies on oil 
companies based on the pollution incidents from the carriage of each company’s 
oil.  The justification of this suggestion is that such differentiation would force 
the oil companies to charter ships of best quality and to avoid chartering sub-
standard ships as a means of cutting the cost of chartering at the expense of 
safety. See TAN, supra note 11, at 342-43.  The benefit of such mechanisms 
would be indirect whereas inducing ship-owners to properly maintain their 
ships would be direct and thereby more efficient.  For comments on similar 
suggestions about the identical contribution formula to oil industry’s private 
agreement, see Contract Regarding an Interim Settlement of Tanker Liability 
for Oil Pollution, Jan. 14, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 137, 137 (1971); see also M’GONIGLE & 
ZACHER, supra note 3, at 182. 
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advance and supplementary “calls” (premium) charged by the 
P&I clubs,95 the IOPC Fund also levies the oil companies based 
on the anticipated liability first and on the actual liability later.96  
Technically, there may be credit back to the contributors if the 
actual liability is less than the anticipated amount.  However, 
this situation is rare.97 
Although the creation of the IOPC Fund is a praiseworthy 
innovation in terms of providing adequate compensation, its 
presence may reduce the deterrence effect of ship-owners’ liability 
to the extent the Fund pays for oil pollution damage caused by 
the negligence of ship-owners.  This argument is not really 
against the Fund’s role to provide adequate compensation but 
against its role to partially absorb a negligent ship-owner’s 
liability.  However, there are many situations under the Fund 
Convention where the IOPC Fund pays compensation and there 
is no question of ship-owners’ negligence.98  These situations 
include natural disaster,99 action of a third party, or negligence of 
the government authority in charge of maintaining lights and 
navigational aids.100  In the latter two situations, the Fund may 
 
 95. HAZELWOOD, supra note 68, at 122. 
 96. See SECRETARIAT, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: EXPLANATORY NOTE 4-5 
(Sept. 2011), available at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf [hereinafter 
Explanatory note of IOPC Fund]. See also M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 
192. 
 97. In the 1992 IOPC Fund, in the year 2000 alone, £3.7 million was credited 
back to the contributors from the unused contributions of 1999. See Explanatory 
note of IOPC Fund, supra note 96, at 4-5. 
 98. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4, para. 1(a). 
 99. This situation is expressly mentioned in the CLC as an exonerating factor 
for ship-owner’s liability. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. III, para. 2(a).  Its 
absence among exonerating factors in the Fund Convention is deliberate as 
article 4(4)(b) of the Fund Convention stipulates the conditions for the Fund to 
pay compensation in such situation. See Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 
4, para. 4(b). 
 100. Again, the liability of the Fund in these two situations is implied since 
they are not mentioned among the exonerating situations.  This is also clear 
from the negotiations of the parties at the 1971 Conference, where some states 
(including Canada and the United States) demanded that the Fund should cover 
all cases of oil pollution damage not covered by the CLC.  However, as a 
compromise, the Fund is exonerated from any liability for oil pollution from 
unknown sources (mysterious spills) or when the cause of the damage is war or 
war-like situation. See M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 184-85. 
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claim reimbursement from the third party and the government 
under the principle of subrogation.101 
Payment by the Fund for oil pollution damage caused solely 
by natural disasters reinforces the fact that the primary goal of 
the oil pollution liability regime is the provision of adequate 
compensation as opposed to the creation of deterrence from 
negligence.102  However, providing adequate compensation 
through the IOPC Fund in the above three situations does not 
affect the deterrent effect of the liability law because no optimal 
precautionary steps taken by ship-owners could prevent pollution 
damage in those cases.103  Consequently, there can be no 
objection to the Fund’s role in providing compensation where 
ship-owners’ negligence has no causal connection with an incident 
of oil pollution damage.  In these cases, the Fund functions solely 
as an insurer for pollution victims and not for negligent ship-
owners. 
The justification for compensation from the Fund in cases of 
natural disaster lies in the social benefit of internalizing the cost 
of “externalities” arising from oil pollution.104  Oil pollution 
damage suffered by people not involved in the transportation 
contract is an external social cost (i.e., an externality) flowing 
from the transportation of oil.105  If neither ship-owners nor oil 
companies bear this cost, the price of oil to consumers would not 
reflect this externality.  Consequently, the market price of oil 
would be less than its real social cost and there would be 
excessive consumption of oil.  This means that some people whose 
 
 101. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 9, para. 2. 
 102. It is noteworthy here that the maximum liability limit of the Fund 
applies to per natural disaster regardless of the number of shipping incidents 
caused by the same natural disaster. See Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 
4, para. 4(a), (b); see also M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 185. 
 103. The deterrence effect of liability is compromised when a potentially liable 
person who can take care to prevent or reduce the loss does not have to pay for 
full liability because other parties such as the IOPC Fund foot the bill. 
 104. For the definition of “externality,” see Ralph C. d’Arge & Emery K. Hunt, 
Environmental Pollution, Externalities, and Conventional Economic Wisdom: A 
Critique, 1 B.C.  ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 266, 266-67 (1972); see also ARTHUR C. 
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932) (the classic work on 
externalities). 
 105. MITCHELL, supra note 50, at 74-75. 
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benefits from consumption of oil are less than the consumed oil’s 
real social costs would buy oil. 
On the other hand, if oil companies pay for this kind of oil 
pollution damage through the IOPC Fund, the price of oil will 
reflect its real social cost; and those consumers whose utility from 
consumption of oil is below this cost will not consume this 
valuable limited resource.106  In other words, the cost of oil 
pollution externalities will thus be internalized. Internalization of 
externalities leads to optimal resource allocation and prevents 
social waste.  This also indirectly reduces the incidents of oil 
pollution to the extent the incidents of oil pollution are causally 
correlated to the amount of oil transported via sea because 
reduced consumption will naturally reduce the amount of oil 
transported via sea.  As a result, imposing levies on oil companies 
for oil pollution damage from ships due to natural elements of the 
sea makes economic sense. 
The innovative insurance arrangement through the IOPC 
Fund has greatly contributed to the success of the oil pollution 
liability regime in providing adequate compensation.  Although 
provisions have been made for a similar fund under the HNS 
Convention,107 one of the important elements of an insurance pool 
is rather weak in the case of the HNS Fund; that is, a large pool 
of similar insured risks.  Unlike oil, the hazardous and noxious 
substances covered under the HNS Convention and carried via 
sea are diverse in nature and pose dissimilar risks.  The number 
of such substances is likely to exceed 6,000 and they are carried 
in different vessel types and sizes.108  This would be the main 
obstacle to the provision of a second tier of insurance through the 
HNS Fund, when the HNS Convention comes into force.  
Contributors of the HNS Fund would be the various chemical 
companies.109 
 
 106. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 70-72. 
 107. See HNS Convention, supra note 55, at art. 9, para. 1(a)(ii), art. 14, para. 
5(a)—(b). The HNS Fund would cover damages up to SDR250 million including 
SDR100 million from ship-owners. 
 108. TAN, supra note 11, at 335-36. 
 109. See generally id. at 334-56. 
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E. Insurance through the Supplementary Fund 
The goal of adequate compensation for oil pollution damage 
has been greatly achieved by the creation of a new 
Supplementary Fund in 2003, culminating from a succession of 
initiatives following the Erika incident off the coast of Brittany, 
France, in 1999.110  As mentioned earlier, the Supplementary 
Fund would provide up to SDR750 million (US$1.18 billion) for a 
single oil pollution incident on the waters of a contracting 
state.111  The Supplementary Fund functions as a third tier of 
insurance against oil pollution damage.112  It kicks in when the 
liability limit of the IOPC Fund is exhausted in providing 
compensation for oil pollution damage.  With the exception of the 
higher compensation ceiling, the Supplementary Fund’s scope of 
application and compensation procedures is similar to those of 
the IOPC Fund.  As a result, all the above discussion related to 
the IOPC Fund’s effect on deterrence from negligent navigation 
applies equally to the Supplementary Fund. 
The contribution mechanism of the Supplementary Fund is 
also similar to that of the IOPC Fund: its contributions come from 
the oil companies in the contracting states to the Supplementary 
Fund Protocol.  Like the IOPC Fund, the Supplementary Fund 
levies those oil companies that receive over 150,000 tons of oil via 
the sea from the contracting States.113  One important difference 
between the two funds is that each contracting state to the 
Supplementary Fund has to make a minimum contribution 
 
 110. The ship broke into two with 31,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.  It spilled 
19,800 tons of oil.  As of October 2010, a total of 7,131 claims had been made, 
and the total amount claimed reached as high as €388.9 million, of which 5,939 
were admitted and €129.7 million paid for. The remaining 1,016 claims were 
rejected. See Incidents, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, http:// 
www.iopcfund.org/erika.htm (last updated May 9, 2011) (discussing Erika). 
 111. See Supplementary Fund Protocol, supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
This amount is, however, in combination with SDR230 million from the IOPC 
Fund and SDR89.77 million from ship-owners. 
 112. Even though no incident requiring compensation from the Supplementary 
Fund has yet occurred since its coming into existence on March 3, 2005, the 
contracting states or the oil companies in those states have been levied 
£0.0017223 per ton of contributing oil on March 1, 2007 for meeting the 
Supplementary Fund’s administrative expenses. See Explanatory note of IOPC 
Fund, supra note 96, at 5-6. 
 113. Supplementary Fund Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 10. 
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regardless of whether any company in the state receives over 
150,000 tons of oil.  This minimum contribution is based on a 
presumed receipt of one million tons of contributing oil, if the 
total oil receipt in the state falls below the one million ton 
threshold.114  The responsibility to pay for any amount falling 
short of the threshold limit lies with the contracting state’s 
government,115 as opposed to the oil companies in it.  The purpose 
of this provision is to ensure that each contracting state bears 
some of the costs of the Supplementary Fund’s total yearly 
expenses.116 
The compulsory minimum payment makes the 
Supplementary Fund resemble a mutual insurance fund more 
than a pure compensation fund.  Like any insurance pool where 
each insured has to pay a premium in order to obtain insurance 
protection, each contracting state to the Supplementary Fund 
Protocol has to contribute something in order to benefit from this 
third layer of insurance protection.  On the other hand, a 
contracting state to the Fund Convention can receive 
compensation from the IOPC Fund without making any 
contribution to the fund if no oil company in that state receives 
over 150,000 tons of oil in a fiscal year.117  For example, twenty-
five states out of one 104 state parties to the Fund Convention in 
2009 did not have to pay any contribution to the IOPC Fund since 
no oil companies in those countries received oil over the minimum 
threshold.118  The non-contributing states are usually developing 
states with small economies.  Lack of contribution, however, does 
not affect their eligibility to seek compensation from the IOPC 
Fund.  The IOPC Fund’s formula is a laudable approach to the 
 
 114. Id. at art. 14, para. 1. 
 115. Id. at art. 14, para. 2. 
 116. THIRD INTERSESSIONAL WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE SECOND AND THIRD 
MEETINGS OF THE THIRD INTERSESSIONAL WORKING GROUP OF THE 1992 FUND 19-
20, available at http://documentservices.iopcfund.org/meeting-documents/search-
results/?query=92FUND%2FWGR.3%2F9&titles-only=0&titles-only=1&fund-
session=fund-2&session_number=&working_group_number=&agenda_item= 
&start-year=1978&end-year=2011 (follow “92 FUND/WGR3/9” hyperlink). 
 117. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10, para. 1. 
 118. INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT 2010: INTERNATIONAL 
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goal of adequate compensation for oil pollution damage, as well as 
to the protection of the marine environment.119 
From an environmental point of view, the Supplementary 
Fund’s contribution and compensation formulae are regrettable.  
An oil spill incident may cause as much damage to a developing 
country as to a developed one and may require as much 
compensation for both clean-up costs and monetary damage 
arising from oil pollution.  Despite this equal need for 
compensation, the burden of minimum compulsory contribution 
on the developing states would be unequally heavy.  Fear of this 
burden discourages them from becoming parties to the 
Supplementary Fund Protocol.120 
Developing states usually receive less oil and via smaller 
tankers.  Thus, they may be exposed to fewer, if any, devastating 
oil pollution incidents, an observation supported by the history of 
the most disastrous oil pollution accidents.121  This observation, 
however, actually provides additional support for requiring 
minimum compulsory contributions to the Supplementary Fund 
from developing countries, as they would hardly require 
compensation from the Supplementary Fund.  Yet, this does not 
completely obviate their need for assurance of compensation from 
the Supplementary Fund for a random extraordinarily large 
incident exceeding the limit of the IOPC Fund.  Following such a 
spill, clean-up operations and adequate compensation should not 
be affected by a state’s financial ability to contribute to the 
Supplementary Fund. 
In addition, oil pollution incidents in some developing 
countries may occur due to the transport of oil to the developed 
 
 119. It is noteworthy here that oil pollution compensation covers not only the 
losses suffered by individual victims but also expenses for preventive measures 
taken by private individuals or public authorities to reduce or eliminate 
environmental damage from an oil spill. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 6 
(defining “pollution damage”).  In fact, most of the compensation payouts are 
made against the latter type of damage. 
 120. One factor for the widespread acceptance of the Fund Convention is that 
the governments of the contracting states do not have to contribute any money 
to the IOPC Fund.  The burden only falls on the oil companies in the state 
parties. See TAN, supra note 11, at 332-33. 
 121. Deepwater Horizon, Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, Exxon Valdez, Erika, 
Nakahodka and Prestige all occurred on the waters of developed countries. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
  
70 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
 
world en route through the developing countries’ waters.  For 
example, oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe, 
Japan, and the U.S. touch the waters of many African and Asian 
countries.122  Yet, if a serious oil pollution incident occurs in those 
countries, compensation will not be forthcoming from the 
Supplementary Fund because these countries are not parties to 
the Supplementary Fund Protocol, having been discouraged by its 
compulsory minimum contribution. 
F. Insurance from national oil pollution funds 
Although the question of adequate compensation may seem to 
be fully addressed by the creation of the Supplementary Fund, 
the international oil pollution liability regime neither recognizes 
all types of ‘oil’ nor covers all pollution from the recognized types 
of oil.  Compensation under the international regime is limited to 
pollution damage from “persistent oil.”123  Even if the pollution 
arises from persistent oil but the source of pollution is unknown 
or is not a ship, neither the ship-owners nor the two funds will 
provide compensation.124  In addition, there are only twenty-
seven state parties to the Supplementary Fund compared to 105 
 
 122. M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 185, 233. 
 123. The CLC defines “oil” as “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as 
crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil, whether carried on board a 
ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship.” CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, 
para. 5 (emphasis added).  The same definition is included in the Fund 
Convention by reference.  Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, para. 2.  
Canada’s proposal to define the word “oil” broadly under the Fund Convention 
in order to include “liquid hydrocarbon of any kind” was opposed by the oil 
industry and many oil-importing countries on the ground, inter alia, that such a 
wide definition would cause the involvement of the IOPC Fund in a large 
number of minor oil spill cases. See INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MAR. CONSULTATIVE 
ORG., OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPENSATION FUND FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1971 320-21 
(1978) [hereinafter Official Records of the 1971 Fund Conference]. 
 124. An American proposal to require the IOPC Fund to pay compensation for 
“mysterious” spills was also rejected by the oil industry and some states on the 
same ground that it would necessitate frequent involvement of the Fund for 
many small spills.  Yet, the Scandinavian proposal to limit the Fund’s 
contribution only to cases of oil pollution damage exceeding 15 million francs 
(US$1 million) was not accepted by the oil industry. Official Records of the 1971 
Fund Conference, supra note 123, at 355-65, 384-88; M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, 
supra note 3, at 185-89, n. 78. 
29
  
2011] THE ROLE OF INSURANCE 71 
 
parties to the Fund Convention.125  As a result, there is always 
the likelihood that either an oil pollution incident will not fall 
under the international oil pollution liability regime126 or oil 
pollution in non-state parties to the Supplementary Fund will 
exceed the IOPC Fund’s limit. 
The goal of adequate compensation, however, requires that 
these gaps in the international oil pollution liability regime be 
filled by national compensation funds, another layer of insurance 
against oil pollution damage.  Canada responded to this need 
through the creation of the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund 
(SOPF).127  The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) in the 
U.S. also serves a similar function.  The SOPF covers any oil 
pollution damage not covered by the international liability law 
regime for any of the above reasons; however, it heavily 
subsidizes ship-owners at the expense of oil companies, who are 
the main contributors to the SOPF.128  In many cases, there is no 
connection between the contributors and the beneficiaries of the 
SOPF in Canadian domestic oil pollution cases.  Most of the oil 
pollution cases compensated by the SOPF arose from the bunker 
of non-tankers,129 while the contributions to the SOPF mainly 
come from oil companies.  The solution seems to be to require all 
vessels, tankers and non-tankers, small or large, to carry 
compulsory insurance against oil pollution. 
 
 125. See About the IOPC Fund, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, supra note 
20. 
 126. As indicated, although the Deepwater Horizon would be considered a 
vessel under the OPA, this would not be so under the international oil pollution 
liability regime. See supra note 29.  Thus, even if the U.S. were a party to the 
international liability regime, no compensation would come from any of the 
international funds. 
 127. See THE SHIP-SOURCE OIL POLLUTION FUND, ADM’R’S ANNUAL REPORT 2005-
2006 37 (2006), available at http://www.ssopfund.gc.ca/documents/ 
2006ShipSourceAR_e.pdf [hereinafter SOPF ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 128. Id. at 3-5. 
 129. This is evidenced from the fact that most of  the 47 incidents reported in 
the SOPF ANNUAL REPORT were not from oil tankers (ships carrying oil as cargo), 
indicating bunkers as the source of spilled oil.  See id. at 7-29.  This was one of 
the reasons the oil industry rejected the proposal to provide compensation in 
cases of oil spills from unknown sources in the 1971 IMO conference. See Official 
Records of the 1971 Fund Conference, supra note 123, at 320-21. 
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III. DECREASE OF ACCIDENTAL OIL SPILLS AND 
INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
A. Reduced oil pollution incidents 
Empirical evidence shows that the incidents of accidental oil 
spills from tankers are steadily decreasing.130  A survey of oil spill 
incidents in Canada shows that between 1993 and 2006 only 7.5 
percent of the total spills were from tankers, while 75.5 percent 
were from non-tanker and 17 percent from unknown ships or 
other sources (“mysterious spills”).131  This trend can also be 
observed worldwide.  The world saw a dramatic decrease in the 
number of oil spill accidents from tankers in the last forty-one 
years.132  For large spills of over 700 tons from 1970-1979, there 
were more than twenty-five spills on average per year.  The 
number of such spills declined to an average of 9.3 per year 
during 1980-1989, 7.8 per year in the period of 1990-1999, and 
only 3.3 spills per year over the period of 2000-2010.133 
In addition to reduction in number, the size of the spills has 
also gradually decreased.  The majority of oil spills from 1970 to 
2010 were below seven tons, with most of the large spills 
occurring in the earlier years.134  Logically, the amount of total 
spilled oil per year is also on the decline from 1980 onward except 
in a few random years when one or two large spills made the total 
quantity exceed the average by a large amount.135  This 
 
 130. It is noteworthy here that oil pollution liability law addresses the 
problem of accidental as opposed to operational oil pollution. 
 131. See SOPF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 127, at 37. 
 132. See Statistics, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N, 
http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics/ 
index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); See also KEISHA HUIJER, INT’L TANKER 
OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N, TRENDS IN OIL SPILLS FROM TANKER SHIPS 1995-2004 
(2005), available at http://www.itopf.com/assets/documents/ amop05.pdf. 
 133. See Statistics, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N, supra note 132. 
 134. See id.  As the oil spill from Deepwater Horizon is not from an oil tanker 
or a conventional ship, the statistics in the ITOPF’s website do not include this 
incident among the major oil spills. 
 135. See id.  As for similar progress in the United States, see generally Joint 
Hearing on Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard & 
Mar. Transp. and Water Res. & Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. & 
Infrastructure, 106th Cong. 12 (1999) (statement of James Loy, Commandant, 
U.S. Coast Guard). 
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downward trend in the incidents of oil spills is the result of a 
combination of many factors including the above-mentioned 
insurance arrangements.  Other factors, which are not discussed 
in this article, include strict liability for oil pollution damage, 
higher liability limit, and some non-liability legal aspects such as 
improved tanker design and strong port state control.136 
B. Role of insurance in the decrease of oil pollution 
incidents 
Although this article mainly highlights the role of insurance 
in providing adequate compensation in the above discussion, 
innovative insurance arrangements in the oil pollution liability 
regime has also incidentally improved the deterrence aspect of 
the liability law; increasing deterrence in turn contributes to the 
reduction of oil pollution incidents.  As this article has 
occasionally alluded to the latter role of insurance when 
discussing the justifications of the various insurance 
arrangements, the discussion here will be brief. 
First, compulsory insurance prevents a negligent ship-owner 
from escaping liability by keeping its corporate assets low 
through forming a “one-ship” company.137  This is because there 
will always be proceeds from compulsory insurance after an 
accident regardless of the value of the ship or its corporate status.  
This increases the probability of actual liability on ship-owners.  
As a result, their expected liability will now be higher than 
before, reflected in the insurance premium ship-owners pay.138  
 
 136. For a discussion on the effect of these factors on the reduction of oil 
pollution incidents, see generally Muhammad Masum Billah, Effects of 
Insurance’s Absence or Presence on Maritime Liability Law with Special 
Reference to Cargo Liability and Oil Pollution Liability Regimes: An Economic 
Analysis 222-38 (2009) (unpublished LL.D thesis, Univ. of Ottawa) (on file with 
author). 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 47 (example of the widespread practice 
among ship-owners of forming “one-ship” corporations). 
 138. For example, if oil pollution causes on average $1,000 worth of damage 
per incident and the probability of liability (compensation) is 100 percent (i.e., 
liability is certain), the average expected liability of a ship-owner is $1,000 
($1,000 x 100%).  On the other hand, if the probability is lower, like 50 percent, 
the expected liability per incident would be $500 ($1,000 x 50%). The premium 
for liability insurance is mainly based on this expected liability.  Higher 
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Higher expected liability or increased insurance premiums will 
make the expenditure on optimal care more cost-efficient.139  In 
other words, in some cases where the cost of optimal care seemed 
higher to an insured than the expected liability in the past 
because of the possibility of escaping liability through the 
“corporate veil,” this cost may now appear to be lower than the 
cost of care.  Consequently, a rational ship-owner will be induced 
to take optimal care.140 
Second, direct action against insurers makes the probability 
of actual liability even higher than would be the case without the 
provision of direct action even when insurance is compulsory.  
There are two explanations for this: first, despite compulsory 
insurance, an insured may be bankrupt and the insurer could 
simultaneously deny the liability judgment on grounds of lack of 
privity of contract between the insurer and the liability claimant; 
second, the insurer may plead some policy defenses or exceptions 
(e.g., non-payment of premium) against the insured and 
consequently against the claimant.  The provisions of direct 
action against insurers under the oil pollution liability regime 
eliminated both these possibilities.141 
As insurers will be exposed to more frequent payouts to the 
victims of oil pollution in cases of negligence by the insured ship-
owner, insurers will charge higher premiums on negligent ship-
owners.  Increased premiums will in turn induce the insured to 
 
expected liability would require a higher premium, while lower expected liability 
will reduce the premium. See Billah, supra note 10, at 310. 
 139. Using the example from the previous note, when the expected liability is 
$500 due to the low probability of liability, a ship-owner may not want to spend 
more than $500 on care. On the other hand, when the liability is certain (100 
percent probability) and the expected liability is $1,000, a ship-owner would not 
hesitate to spend up to $1,000 on care in order not to be held liable. Whenever 
the cost of care is less than the damage it prevents, care is cost-efficient or 
optimal. 
 140. Cost of optimal care can never be more than the expected liability 
because optimal care, by definition, is care that costs less than the probability-
discounted or expected liability. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward 
a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055, 1056-57 (1972).  However, 
cost of optimal care might appear higher because of the lower probability of 
being held liable due to a liable party’s ability to escape from paying for liability 
judgment. See SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 230-32, 387-91. 
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reduce their insurer’s exposure to oil pollution claims.142  The 
only way the insured can do this is through improving their 
standard of care so that the number of oil pollution incidents 
decreases from the existing level.  The dramatic reduction in oil 
pollution accidents may be at least partly due to this indirect 
incentive towards care, emanating from the provision of direct 
action in the oil pollution liability regime. 
The direct action provision also motivates insurers to be 
extra vigilant against the negligent conducts of their insured 
ship-owners.  Insurers have various tools such as premium rate 
variance, deductibles, policy limit, and even outright denial of 
coverage to check the carelessness of insured ship-owners.143  
Since insurers use these tools even when there is no provision for 
direct action against them, they now have an added incentive to 
use them more frequently.  The end result is increased pressure 
on the owners of substandard ships to take optimal care. 
Lastly, even though the second and third tier of insurance 
through the IOPC and Supplementary Funds are mainly 
designed for adequate compensation and are funded by the oil 
industry and not by ship-owners, these arrangements indirectly 
put pressure on ship-owners to be more diligent in the operation 
of their ships.  This is because oil companies, who are the main 
contributors to both funds, are also the main, if not sole, 
customers of the oil-carrying ships (tankers).  Given that the 
operation of these ships has a direct effect on the ultimate 
contributions that oil companies make to the Funds, oil 
companies as a group are naturally opposed to and united against 
substandard shipping.  This opposition translates into various 
initiatives to motivate ship-owners toward optimal care.  One 
such initiative is a database maintained by the oil industry on 
substandard ships, known as the Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) 
 
 142. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, 
LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1986). 
 143. See generally Muhammad Masum Billah, Incentive Effect of Liability 
Rules in the Presence of Liability Insurance in the Maritime Law Context: An 
Economic Analysis, 31 DALHOUSIE L. J. 427 (2008).  These mechanisms make the 
insured as “co-insured” or “self-insured” by making the insured bear at least 
partial risk of the loss or liability. For more on insurance policies and risk 
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Program.144  The database contains inspection reports on many 
oil-carrying ships. 
Another initiative, which is more direct, is to demand 
indemnification from ship-owners for compensation paid out of 
the IOPC and Supplementary Funds, especially in cases of 
liability for small ships where the Funds are more likely to bear 
the disproportionate burden of oil pollution compensation.145  In 
this regard, after the creation of the Supplementary Fund, two 
voluntary agreements146 were reached between oil companies and 
ship-owners through their International Group of P&I clubs, 
whereby ship-owners agreed to indemnify the IOPC and 
Supplementary Funds for oil pollution arising from small ships or 
oil pollution requiring contribution from the Supplementary 
Fund.  Again, the increased burden of liability on ship-owners 
through these insurance arrangements leads to more deterrence 
and, consequently, a reduction in oil pollution incidents. 
The last point proves a much repeated principle in economic 
analysis of liability law, known as the Coase Theorem.147  
According to the Theorem, if there is little to no transaction 
(negotiation) cost, optimal care (i.e., efficient allocation of 
resources to bring such care) will be undertaken by the party who 
can take such care regardless of which side bears the initial 
 
 144. See SIRE Introduction, OIL COMPANIES INT’L MARINE FORUM (OCIMF), 
http://www.ocimf.com/SIRE/introduction (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 145. This is because the liability of a ship-owner depends on the tonnage of the 
ship.  So, the maximum liability of small ships may be less than the actual 
damage they cause, thus requiring more frequent involvement of the IOPC and 
the Supplementary Funds to pay for the unpaid compensation. See Tan , supra 
note 11, at 332. 
 146. They are the Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement 
(STOPIA) 2006 and the Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement 
(TOPIA) 2006.  These agreements have been in operation since February 20, 
2006.  Under STOPIA, the International Group of P&I clubs (the Group) will 
bear up to SDR20 million of liability for oil pollution from any ship with total 
tonnage of 29,584 or less in the contracting states to the Fund Convention.  This 
is despite the lower limit of ship-owners’ liability under the CLC. Under TOPIA, 
the Group will indemnify the Supplementary Fund for 50 percent of the 
payment for oil pollution arising from any ship covered by the Group. See 
Explanatory note of IOPC Fund, supra note 96, at 6. 
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liability.148  Although a transaction with zero cost may never 
exist in the real world, transaction costs would be minimal and 
the parties could allocate their resources optimally where the 
parties can easily bargain and “are of approximately equal size, 
number, expertise, and wealth.”149  In the context of oil pollution 
liability, such transactions do exist between ship-owners and oil 
companies due to their equal bargaining power and mutual 
dependence on each other.  As a result, even though the initial 
burden of additional oil pollution compensation through the IOPC 
Fund and the Supplementary Fund falls on oil companies, the 
negotiation between the organizations representing ship-owners 
and oil companies ultimately leads to the optimal allocation of 
resources to reduce oil pollution incidents. 
 IV. CONCLUSION 
The international oil pollution liability law regime is one of 
the best examples of how proper insurance arrangements can 
guarantee the success of liability law in providing adequate 
compensation and deterring liable parties from negligent 
behavior.  However, its excessive focus on compensation 
sometimes ignores the most important goal of liability law: 
deterrence.  Providing compensation from various funds not 
contributed to by liable ship-owners does not promote the goal of 
deterrence.  Luckily, this has not led to an increase in oil 
pollution incidents because the oil industry puts indirect pressure 
on ship-owners to provide well-maintained ships.  Accidental oil 
pollution incidents from ships are on the decline.  This is brought 
 
 148. The theorem is usually discussed in the context of two parties without 
any prior contractual relationship, where the action of one side causes harm to 
the other (e.g., the action of a rancher raising cattle causes harm to the crops of 
a neighboring farmer).  Although there are contractual relationships between 
individual ship-owners and individual oil companies to transport oil, no such 
contract exists between these two groups.  The action of the former as a group 
(i.e., negligent navigation) causes harm to the latter group (i.e., increased 
contribution to the IOPC and Supplement Funds to pay for pollution damage).  
See id. at 2-5. 
 149. CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 172. 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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about by a multitude of factors; among these factors, innovative 
insurance arrangements are very important. 150 
Despite the positive observations above, some aspects of the 
international oil pollution liability regime need improvement.  
The scope of its application is very narrow compared to the OPA.  
Since the international regime covers only pollution damage from 
oil tankers or ships which are adapted to carry oil as cargo and 
are actually carrying oil at the time of an oil spill, it would not 
cover the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill—the world’s largest 
oil spill incident—even if the U.S. were a party to it.  This is 
regrettable because oil companies will always be the source of 
these types of oil spills, and they finance both the IOPC and 
Supplementary Funds in the international regime.  Furthermore, 
the definitions of “oil” and “ship” are broader in U.S. law than in 
the international regime.  Lastly, the mandatory minimum 
contribution to the Supplementary Fund stands in the way of the 
ratification of the Supplementary Fund Protocol by many 
developing states.  Where devastating oil pollution incidents 
occur in non-state parties to the Supplementary Fund Protocol, 
this affects both the international oil pollution regime’s primary 
goal of adequate compensation as well as clean-up measures in 
affected marine environments. 
 
 
 150. Among the other factors are strict liability for oil pollution, higher 
liability limit, improved tanker designs (e.g., double-hull) and strong 
enforcement of oil pollution regulations by port states.  See Billah, supra note 
136, at 222-38. 
37
